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THE CATHEDRAL THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:
A COMMENTARY ON DAGAN AND DORFMAN’S JUST
RELATIONSHIPS
Benjamin C. Zipursky∗
INTRODUCTION
In their edifying and ambitious recent article Just Relationships,
Professors Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman suggest that everyone
before them has erred in their account of the distinction between public
law and private law.1 Classic liberal scholars—a category meant to cover
Thomas Hobbes and William Blackstone through the nineteenth century
to Richard Epstein,2 Ernest Weinrib,3 and Arthur Ripstein4—endorse a
prepolitical conception of rights and then treat private law as clarifying
and concretizing that domain; clarity of enforceability of rights permits
freedom and recognizes equality. Conversely, realists and instrumentalist
scholars—typiﬁed by the law and economics school—do not really think
there is a distinction between private law and public law; private law is
just public law in disguise.5 The legal system creates legal entitlements
and rules enforcing them in order to serve important public beneﬁts in
the long run.6
Both sides are wrong, Dagan and Dorfman tell us. Classic liberals are
wrong in thinking there is a domain of prepolitical rights and private law
preserves this domain thorugh special juridical forms. Instrumentalists
are mistaken in rejecting the public–private distinction altogether. Dagan
and Dorfman put forward the best of both worlds in their “just
relationships” theory. They tell us that private law is distinctive
because it focuses on the relations between private people as free
and equal persons (while public law—such as constitutional law—is
essentially about the state’s relation to individuals and the regulation

∗. Professor of Law and James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham Law
School. Thanks to John Goldberg for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to
Professors Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman for being great interlocutors.
1. Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1395
(2016).
2. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
3. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (1995).
4. Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs (2016) [hereinafter Ripstein, Private Wrongs].
5. Leon Green, Tort Law as Public Law in Disguise, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
6. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1410 (arguing lawyer-economists “see
private law as just another means to serve our public goals”).
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of individual interactions7). Yet private law is not derived from
individualistic, mutually independent persons having their own
prepolitical domain of entitlements. To the contrary, it is a normative
legal scheme that the state puts forward for public-law-like reasons: to
enhance human liberty, equality, and ﬂourishing in a world of
interdependent persons.
Traveling from moral and political theory to black letter law,
Dagan and Dorfman focus on cases from tort, contract, property,
and restitution to make their point. They offer the variability of the
standard of care,8 incompetence and unconscionability,9 mistaken
payment,10 and numerous other doctrines to explain the sense in
which private law is already engaged in the enterprise of defining the
realm of horizontal rights and duties for a substantively free and equal
society.
In a number of ways, I am sympathetic to Dagan and Dorfman’s
project. Indeed, over the past twenty years, Professor John Goldberg and
I have devoted much of our energy to displaying tort law as a domain of
relational duties among private parties, and, unlike some of those whom
Dagan and Dorfman criticize, our model is substantive rather than
formal.11 Like Dagan and Dorfman, we have rejected both corrective
justice theory and instrumentalism. And, like them, we have recognized
both the possibility and the importance of designing schemes of rights
and duties that answer to substantive values.12
Nevertheless, there is plenty in Dagan and Dorfman’s Just
Relationships with which I disagree as a matter of legal theory and as a
matter of law. Disagreements tend to provide more engaging reading
than incessant head-nodding, so Part I will set forth objections to a
variety of medium-sized claims in their paper. Part II articulates my
reasons for rejecting what I refer to as their taxonomic claim: the claim
that private law is best understood as an effort by our political system to set out
just terms of interaction between private parties. In Part III, however, I step
back from my negativity and offer a reconception of their article as a
transformation of the standing, realist view of private law set forth in

7. Id. at 1397 (noting “public law . . . governs our interactions as patients of the
welfare state or as citizens of a democracy”).
8. Id. at 1431–35.
9. Id. at 1425–26.
10. Id. at 1456–57.
11. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L.
Rev. 917 (2010); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts,
51 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse].
12. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Oxford Introductions
to U.S. Law: Torts 27–45 (2010) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Oxford Introductions].
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Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s classic Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.13
I. PROBLEMS WITH SETUP AND EVIDENCE
First and foremost, Dagan and Dorfman’s setup is exaggerated in
ways that will matter to their targets. Let’s start with the classic liberals. To
be sure, there is some resemblance between Epstein’s Lockean view and
Ripstein’s Kantian view; each is willing to be grouped with a corrective
justice theorist and each is committed to a rights-based conception of
private law.14 But on crucial issues, Epstein and Ripstein are diametrically
opposed in ways that run contrary to what Dagan and Dorfman say. In
particular, Ripstein could not be clearer in rejecting a view that Dagan and
Dorfman claim is central to him: Private law involves state enforcement
of “prepolitical or apolitical interactions.”15 For Ripstein, the role of the
state in articulating rights goes all the way down; there are rights only
because there is a state.16 In this sense, rights are intrinsically
postpolitical. Relatedly, nothing in Ripstein’s view precludes the existence
of legislative measures that are aimed in a Razian, perfectionistic
direction of the sort Dagan and Dorfman suggest. Ripstein has no reason
to reject, for example, the sorts of worker protection we see in mandatory
workers’ compensation laws. He would view this as public law playing a
role in spelling out the fuller state of what background justice requires
for individuals in a particular legal community.17
In addition, Dagan and Dorfman exaggerate their description of law
and economics on the public–private distinction in problematic ways. It
is true, as they claim, that many realists and instrumentalists essentially
denied the public–private distinction altogether.18 But law-and-economics
scholars like Coase, Calabresi, and Posner are in a somewhat different
place. They do think that courts and legislators need to design contract,
property, and tort law in a manner that maximizes overall wealth or

13. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1104–05 (1972).
14. See Ripstein, Private Wrongs, supra note 4, at 6–8 (emphasizing a rights-based
approach and recognizing the superiority of the Weinribian corrective justice approach
over instrumentalism); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict
Liability in Context, 3 J. Tort L., no. 1, 2010, art. 6, at 3–4 (recognizing himself among
corrective justice theorists, but emphasizing differences in approach).
15. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1397.
16. Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Theory 145–81
(2009) (explaining that, on the Kantian view, rights require the institutionalization and
enforceability provided by the state).
17. See id. at 267–99; Ripstein, Private Wrongs, supra note 4, at 292–93 (discussing
workers’ compensation).
18. See, e.g., Green, supra note 5.
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minimizes overall cost.19 Yet it is misleading to say that they merely efface
the public–private distinction. In different ways and to different degrees,
all three thinkers conceive of private law as a means whereby wealth can
be maximized with relatively minimal top-down control. With privately
allocated entitlements plus a set of property rules, liability rules, and
mechanisms for transactions, private actors in a market economy can
pursue individual preference satisfaction while simultaneously expanding
overall wealth. Private law constitutes a distinctive means by which social
welfare moves forward. And, in different ways as to Calabresi, Coase, and
Posner (and the intellectual movement of law and economics generally)
there is a Hayek-inspired admiration for the liberty-enhancing capacity of
private law.
Dagan and Dorfman must sharpen their critical points if they want
to lift their view above their adversaries’. Their actual point is that these
other theorists are too narrow in their vision of the value of tort,
contract, property, and restitution, and this narrowness stems from a
cramped view of the public–private distinction. If we adopt Dagan and
Dorfman’s account of the public–private distinction, which is attractive
for independent reasons, we will see that these areas of law typically
described as “private law” in fact have the capacity to help realize a fuller
sense of liberty and equality. On the liberal view that enshrines the
public–private distinction, the achievement of private law is simply to
safeguard liberty conceived of as a capacity for independent choice and
equality conceived of formally.20 On the instrumentalist view that
recognizes all law aims as public ends, private law manages to structure
private entitlements so that private actors fortuitously achieve more
welfare-enhancing results.21
Dagan and Dorfman invite us to regard private law as the law
governing interactions between private persons (or entities), and, more
generally, as the law specifying the rights and duties as between private
parties. Once we see the domain of private law in this light, then it is
natural to ask: What is the proper allocation of rights and duties between
persons? We cannot answer this question until we get a grip on core values
from a moral and political point of view. Dagan and Dorfman argue that
a legal system and political system like ours is obligated to design
political and legal structures so as to enhance the opportunity for
individuals to ﬂourish as autonomous beings, setting their own ends and

19. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987); R. H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
20. Ripstein, Private Wrongs, supra note 4, at 51 (private law protects “the capacity of
each person to set and pursue his or her own purposes”).
21. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13.
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values within the context of just relationships.22 Somewhat ironically, they
have really borrowed from each of their (polar opposite) antagonists:
from the corrective-justice theorists, the insistence on correlative rights
and duties as essential to private law, which safeguards genuine individual
autonomy, and from the instrumentalists, the willingness to use these
private law structures as means of pursuing overall social goals. Their
general point, in the doctrinal section of the article, is to show that
“private law casts (as it should) interpersonal interactions as frameworks
of relationships between self-determining individuals who respect each
other as the persons they actually are.”23
At least with regard to their principal torts example, Dagan and
Dorfman’s doctrinal discussion is problematic. Their basic claim is that
the standard of care in negligence law is sensitive to the disabilities of a
potential victim.24 In the context of considering a mentally disabled
person “who is hit by a car while crossing the street,” they state that the
victim’s disability can count in two ways.25 First, it can bear on “the
contents of the duty of care owed by the potential injurer” whether the
victim was mentally disabled (and responded as a mentally disabled
person as the car approached her).26 Second, “the victim’s disability may,
under the doctrine of comparative negligence,” alter the negligence
attributable to the victim and correspondingly alter the apportionment
of liability to the injurer.27
Dagan and Dorfman’s read of negligence law on breach is
importantly different than my own and, indeed, is inconsistent with that
of most American jurisdictions and tort scholars. It is true that juries
must consider whether the defendant conducted herself as a reasonably
prudent person would have done under the circumstances,28 and perhaps it
is true that circumstances will sometimes allow mental disabilities to
enter the analysis implicitly.29 And it is true that certain kinds of
demonstrable physical disabilities, such as blindness, will alter the
applicable standard of care for both injurers and victims.30 But, in
conﬂict with Dagan and Dorfman’s characterization, negligence law
famously and overwhelmingly utilizes an objective standard of care that is
22. Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1412 (arguing that “private law’s rights,
obligations, and frameworks structure the pursuit of ends in a relational way”).
23. Id. at 1433.
24. Id. at 1431.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1999, 2014
(2007).
29. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 11
cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 2010) (noting “[t]here are, moreover, circumstances in addition
to apportionment that warrant taking actor’s emotional disorders into account”).
30. See id. § 11 cmt. b.
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insensitive to differences in the mental capacities of defendants.31 As
indicated in the Second and Third Restatements of Torts, the objectivity
of the standard of care—including its insensitivity to mental disabilities of
adults—is one of the most striking features of negligence law, and it
generally applies both as to injurers and as to victims.32 While it may be
the case that the modern trend is toward a more ﬂexible view as to
mental capacities and victims’ negligence,33 this—like the prior
exceptions—is but another wild rose in a ﬁeld of dandelions.34
II. TROUBLES WITH TAXONOMY
My central objection pertains to Dagan and Dorfman’s taxonomic
aspirations. Preliminarily, it will be useful to separate three claims: their
taxonomic claim, their analytic claim, and their evaluative claim (my
distinctions and labels, not theirs).
The taxonomic claim (most concisely expressed in their second
footnote): “[P]rivate law establishes the rights and duties individuals
have as against one another; public law, in contrast, pertains to
individuals’ rights and duties as citizens or vis-à-vis the collective state at
large.”35
The analytic claim: Private law constructs “frameworks of respectful
interaction—of just relationships—among genuinely free and equal
individuals.”36
The evaluative claim: Private law’s construction of just relationships
renders it intrinsically valuable.37
31. See id. § 11 cmt. e (noting that, for adults but not children, a mental or emotional
disability “is typically disregarded in considering whether the person has exercised reasonable
care” and that “[t]his is the position taken by the Restatement Second of Torts § 283B, and . . .
is supported by a consistent line of modern cases”).
32. Id.; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
33. See, e.g., Barry E. Lindahl, 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 3:64 (2d
ed. & Supp. 2016). As the Restatement (Second) points out, however, total insanity is quite
different from a lesser form of mental disability. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B
cmt. c.
34. For their assertion that injurers’ standard of care varies with the mental capacity
of the potential victim, Dagan and Dorfman rely in part on Campbell v. Cluster Housing
Development Fund Co., 668 N.Y.S.2d 634, 635 (App. Div. 1998). See Dagan & Dorfman,
supra note 1, at 1432 n.161. They fail to recognize, however, that the defendant’s duty of
care with regard to the plaintiff in that case was the affirmative duty of a half-way house to
protect the plaintiff. The breach standard in the case of an affirmative duty of an
institution to a person institutionalized is of course different from the breach standard
among strangers in misfeasance cases.
35. Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1397 n.2.
36. Id. at 1397.
37. Id. (“Yet private law is valuable beyond its contingent, external beneﬁts: It is
intrinsically valuable. The intrinsic value of private law lies in its construction of
frameworks of respectful interaction—of just relationships—among genuinely free and
equal individuals.”).
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The question of whether private law constructs frameworks of respectful
interaction is distinct from the questions of: (a) whether that is the only or
at least the principal thing that private law does, (b) whether doing so
falls outside of the range of things that public law does, and (c) whether
private law’s constructing frameworks of respectful interaction is part of what it
is to be private law. Similarly, the question of whether private law’s
construction of frameworks of respectful interaction (assuming it does construct
such frameworks) renders it intrinsically valuable is distinct from the
questions of: (d) whether private law’s construction of frameworks of
respectful interaction is the only thing about private law that renders it
intrinsically valuable, and (e) whether the (putative) truth that private
law’s construction of frameworks of respectful interaction renders private
law intrinsically valuable is what makes private law intrinsically valuable,
qua private law.
My overall contention is that even if Dagan and Dorfman’s analytic
and evaluative claims are true, the answers to (a)–(e) are all negative,
and therefore their taxonomic claim is false.
The easiest way for me to motivate the analytic claim is, for better or
worse, to begin with my own work, both individually and in combination
with Professor John Goldberg. In 1998 I published Rights, Wrongs, and
Recourse in the Law of Torts and laid out a view according to which the law
of torts consists, in signiﬁcant part, of relational norms of conduct.38 I
claimed, in particular, that tort law includes relational directives such as:
For all X, for all Y, X shall not batter Y. Or, for another example: For all
X, for all Y, if X is a physician and Y is a patient of X, then X shall not
injure Y through medical malpractice.39 These relational norms of
conduct simultaneously impose duties to treat people in certain ways and
establish rights to be treated in certain ways.40 In a very straightforward
sense, then, I asserted that much of tort law consists of norms of
interaction.
It is easy to see how such a model might be carried over to contract;
doing so involves asserting a basic norm of keeping one’s obligation: For
all X, for all Y, if X formed a contractual obligation to Y to do A, X shall
do A. And, if along with Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, we understand
property as involving simultaneous multital rights,41 and we understand
those rights to be universal bilateral rights, then we have a basis for
including this within property, too. It is possible that restitution will ﬂow
from an understanding of property rights.
If this were so, then it would be plausible to assert that tort, contract,
and property law all involve relational norms of conduct, which confer
38. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 11, at 59–70.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 719 (1917).
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rights and duties among private parties. This is roughly the same as
Dagan and Dorfman’s analytic claim.42 Moreover, Dagan and Dorfman
plausibly suggest (and I, along with Professor Goldberg, have suggested)
that the construction and enforcement of relational norms of conduct is
an irreducibly important part of what tort law does.43 By parity of
reasoning, one might argue that the same is true of property and
contract. If so, then we are brought roughly to Dagan and Dorfman’s
evaluative claim. Dagan and Dorfman go further, however: Seeing tort,
contract, and property as all parts of private law, they conclude that
schemes of relational duty lie at the essence of private law, while
schemes of duty to the state relate to public law.44 That is their
taxonomic claim. Here are my concerns with it:
(a′) Private law does much more than construct relational norms of
conduct. Contract empowers people to come together for exchanges.
Property law allows for transfer of property. Corporate law creates private
entities with a variety of powers, rights, and duties. H.L.A. Hart’s The
Concept of Law famously discusses the basic point: Legal rules do not only
impose duties; they also create legal powers of various forms.45 Surely,
private law—with powers to sue, powers to contract, and powers to
transfer—is far more than duty-imposing norms of conduct.
(b′) Much of what is uncontroversially public law rather than private
law creates relational norms of conduct between private parties. It is not
just the criminal law with its relational norms regarding theft, sexual
assault, and homicide. It is also innumerable statutes and regulations
governing employers and employees, strangers who may not eavesdrop
upon one another, commercial sellers and their representations to
consumers, landlord–tenant relations, and on and on and on. These are
all about rights and duties, but they are paradigmatic of public law.

42. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1397.
43. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, Oxford Introductions, supra note 12, at 60–62.
44. Dagan and Dorfman are ambiguous about the degree to which their conception
of the private–public distinction differs from the classical liberal conception principally on
the nature of private law, rather than on the nature of public law, as well. At some points in
the text, it appears that they favor a different conception of public law, too: “[P]ublic
law . . . governs our interactions as patients of the welfare state or as citizens of a democracy.”
Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1397 (emphasis added). The suggestion that public law
is about individuals’ interactions and that it is intrinsically tied to the existence of a welfare state or a
democracy appears to convey a view narrower and more particularized than the vertical,
individual-state view, as traditionally conceived by classic liberals (not to mention
libertarians). However—apart from the fact that this appears untenably narrow on many
levels—Dagan and Dorfman’s footnote to that passage reverts to a more familiar
conception of public law, indicating that the article really is more about reconceptualizing
private law than public law: “Put another way, private law establishes the rights and duties
individuals have against one another; public law, in contrast, pertains to individuals’ rights
and duties as citizens or vis-à-vis the collective state at large.” Id. at 1397 n.2.
45. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3d ed. 2012).
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(c′) Even if we were to accept that each ﬁeld of private law (e.g., tort,
contract) creates and enforces relational directives, it does not follow
that creating and enforcing relational directives is part of being private law.
Every living person with a disability has a circulatory system, but it would
be misleading to say that part of being a disabled person is having a
circulatory system. If we want to know what is distinctive about private
law, we must be picking out something that is not true of areas of public
law or perhaps only true in odd and uncharacteristic domains of public
law. Or at least, we must ﬁnd that—as opposed to public law areas—
relational directives, relational duties, and rights are all that constitute
private law. Statement (b′) above shows that the ﬁrst disjunct is false:
Many areas of public law are ﬁlled with relational duties. Statement (a′)
shows that the second disjunct is also false: Many areas of private law do
much more, like empowering private parties to transfer assets, to bring
lawsuits, to form joint enterprises, and so on. For all of these reasons,
Dagan and Dorfman’s taxonomic claim is unsustainable.
It remains an open question whether recognizing rights and duties
between parties and regulating “just relationships” are (d) the only
things about private law that render it intrinsically valuable, and
therefore whether (e) the attributes of recognizing rights and duties
between parties and regulating “just relationships” are what make private
law intrinsically valuable, qua private law. It should now be clear that in
order for this to be so, the other things done by private law, if valuable at
all, could not be intrinsically valuable. Presumably, that would mean they
are instrumentally valuable—instrumental in enforcing the relational
duties and rights and perhaps instrumental in permitting individuals to
satisfy their various desires and reach their various goals. Of course,
although I accept that part of the value of, for example, the power to
bring a lawsuit is that the social beneﬁts of having relational directives
are realized through their enforceability, I categorically reject the claim
that the value of private powers is entirely derivative or instrumental.
Part of the value of tort law is that it provides individuals with an
avenue of civil redress against their wrongdoers. One might view such
individuals—as in the case of private rights of action under RICO or the
Clayton Act—as acting in part in a private attorney general role.46 That is,
essentially, what Posner has asserted about tort law.47 I have argued that
this would be to miss what is especially private about tort law. The locus
of power is in the individual, and the individual claims the right to have

46. See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (noting both RICO and the
Clayton Act “share a common congressional objective of encouraging civil litigation
to supplement Government efforts to deter and penalize the respectively prohibited
practices”).
47. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence Law, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 48–49
(1972) (describing the efficiency of an individualized, victim-driven enforcement system).
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such a power.48 This may not be the most effective way to see that rights
and duties are generally enjoyed, and it certainly might not be the way to
see that an individual’s rights are most effectively protected—for
example, criminal law and prosecutorial enforcement may be a more
effective means than tort in protecting a woman’s rights as against her
abusive spouse. Yet as a matter of the right of individuals to act selfprotectively and to act self-restoringly, and as a matter of equalizing
power, each individual has a claim against the state to authenticate and
enforce her demands against those who have wronged her.49 Hence, tort
law is a marriage of relational directives to private rights of action.
Contract and property are in many ways equally clear. Contracts
could exist if the state went around sua sponte enforcing them. That is
not our system. Ours empowers individuals with private powers to
demand performance or its equivalent.50 This means that some primary
conduct will be forthcoming. These are not simply random choices of to
whom the state gives the power; the power is provided to the plaintiff
because the plaintiff is entitled to make an authentic demand for
compliance with an obligation.51 More striking, still, in contract, is the
private power to bind oneself and to bind one another. As the classic
liberals have rightly explained, part of having the power is having
autonomy. But this is hardly to say that the power is instrumental. The
autonomy, in the state, is partly constituted by these powers.
III. RECONSTRUCTION (OR THE CATHEDRAL THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS)
Elsewhere, I have supplied my own version of a taxonomic claim:
Private law areas all prominently feature power-conferring rules that
confer powers on individuals and private entities, while public law areas
all prominently feature power-conferring rules that confer powers (and
limit powers) on public entities, such as sovereigns, government
agencies, courts, and legislatures.52 Individual areas such as tort law or
constitutional law are not necessarily constituted by the features that
render them part of private or public law, just as human beings are not
48. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 Harv.
L. Rev. 1757, 1769–71 (2012) (explaining that tort law empowers a plaintiff to exact a
remedy in order to redress a wrong done speciﬁcally to her).
49. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and Responsibilities in the
Law of Torts, in Rights in Private Law 251, 265–70 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds.,
2012).
50. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse and the Plurality of Wrongs,
2014 N.Z. L. Rev. 145 (analyzing diverse areas of private law in terms of the powers they
provide individuals).
51. Id.
52. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in The Oxford Handbook of
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 623, 649–51 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002).
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necessarily constituted by being both bipeds and featherless. Certainly,
tort law can do things—deter harmful conduct, compensate the
injured—that are frequently associated with areas of public law. And part
of what one would ﬁnd in a constitutional law treatise, e.g., Bivens53
claims, might well involve the empowerment of private parties.54
A fuller defense and development of my taxonomic account would
go beyond the scope of this commentary, but such development seems
unnecessary. This is because Dagan and Dorfman’s focus on recreating
the public–private law distinction is a distraction from Just Relationships’s
key contribution. Whether Dagan and Dorfman realize it or not, Just
Relationships puts forth a much larger, more provocative, and more
important goal—a goal that Dagan and Dorfman have a serious shot at
realizing. Clarifying their real goal will require a return to the distinction
between classic liberal private law theorists and the instrumentalists and
realists.
As Dagan and Dorfman see it, the classic liberal view combines an
emphasis on individual freedom and equality as core values of areas like
tort, contract, and property with an assertion that the legal framework of
private law must be formal rather than material in order to protect
freedom. This, according to Dagan and Dorfman, leads to a sharp
distinction between private law (which is formal and freedom-protecting)
and public law (which is material and welfare-seeking). By contrast,
instrumentalists and realists combine the view that private law’s crucial
contribution is delivering better material conditions—as opposed to
freedom and equality—with a skepticism of the putatively intimate
connection between legal formalities and substantive normative values.
This leads to an evisceration of the distinction between public and
private law.
Dagan and Dorfman’s announced plan is to combine the classic
liberal’s recognition of freedom and equality as core values of private law
and recognition of a private law–public law distinction with the realist’s
embrace of the goals of bettering material conditions as a crucial
deliverable of private law areas and the corresponding skepticism of the
intrinsic importance of formalities of private law. They believe that by
putting forward a horizontal conception of private law, they can rescue a
version of the private–public distinction since they regard public law as
vertical, not horizontal.55
For the reasons described in Part II, I do not think their account
rescues the private–public distinction, but my larger point in this section
53. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
54. See, e.g., 1 William J. Rich, Modern Constitutional Law: Liberty and Equality
§ 3:22 (3d ed. 2011 & Supp. 2016).
55. See supra note 44 (characterizing Dagan and Dorfman’s conception of public
law).
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is that the action in their important article lies in its combination of part
of the classic liberal account—the insistence that private law secures
freedom and equality—with another part of the realist account—the
recognition of the thoroughgoing materiality and nonformality of private
law. Following Professor Joseph Raz, Professor Elizabeth Anderson, and a
variety of important contemporary thinkers, Dagan and Dorfman believe
that a Nozickean or Epsteinian or even Ripsteinian conception of
freedom and equality in private law is far too narrow.56 Law, including tort
law, contract law, and property law, plays a crucial role in constructing the
material and institutional conditions in which interdependent individuals
can in fact exercise autonomy in building their lives. In particular,
relational directives in the legal system—and the ongoing adjustment of
relational directives to contemporary needs and aspirations—are critical
to the construction of the conditions for freedom and equality. In this
vein, for example, property law needs to be adapted from its common
law narrowness to include antidiscrimination in housing norms,57 and
contract law needs to be adapted to make room for more
accommodating sorts of employer–employee contracts.58 The conditions
for individuals to flourish as free and equal require advancement in
relational legal norms.
It follows from this view that the formalities of private law, to a great
extent, are not what gives private law its special value—it is the existence
of a legally realized web of relational rights and duties. To this extent,
Dagan and Dorfman share the realist sensibility that private law can and
should seek results in a pragmatic, real-world fashion. However, the use
of the private law to reach public goals is not principally welfarist in its
orientation. To the contrary, the overarching public goal is to create a
real-world framework for autonomy and ﬂourishing, conceived of
substantively. That is what the range of relational directives in the law,
creating rights and duties, is able to do.
There is a deep sense in which Dagan and Dorfman turn upside down
today’s conventional version of realist private law theory. Dagan and
Dorfman do not say enough about what the classic liberal conception of
private law and the realist–instrumentalist conception share: a sense that
private law subjects such as tort, contract, and property are about the
distribution of entitlements. It is of course a distortion to say that scholars
from Coase to Calabresi conceive of entitlements as “stuff possessed,” for
each scholar is expansive in recognizing that rights are rights to conduct
certain activities, and each recognizes that a right of X to do A, as against
Y’s right of being free from A, does not entail a right of X to do A, as

56. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1442 n.203 (citing Elizabeth Anderson,
How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?, 9 Theoretical Inquiries L. 239, 255
(2008)); id. at 1451 n.237 (citing Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 162, 265 (1986)).
57. Id. at 1438–42.
58. Id. at 1442–45.
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against Z’s right of being free from A. And yet we will see that Dagan and
Dorfman’s horizontal, “just relationships” conception of private law is
fundamentally different from an entitlements-based view.
Under Calabresi and Melamed’s view, we can think of both
possessions and raw liberties to do various things as a kind of baseline of
distributions, and then we make a decision about different ways of
protecting the individual’s possession of that stuff and those liberties: a
liability rule, a property rule, and an inalienability rule.59 This is not to
say that they believe these would be legal entitlements without any rule at
all; they do not. Nonetheless what is in common to the different rules is
that they all protect entitlements. Different departments of private law
use different tools, and criminal law uses a different tool still. And the
different tools will have quite different impacts on overall social welfare.
The Kantian liberal, like Ripstein, cuts deeper in a way; she sees that the
notion of having any stuff at all or any domain of liberty is incoherent
except against a background of private law. The formality of private law is
needed for there to be freedom and “stuff” at all. Unsurprisingly, given
the Lockean background of liberalism, there is a property orientation to
the conception of entitlement at the core of private law theory.
Dagan and Dorfman are best read, in my view, as challenging the
entitlement centrism of private law theory in favor of what I regard as a
relationship-centric view. The rules are not different ways of protecting
entitlements. There are no prepolitical entitlements, and, what is more,
there is no prepolitical and nonnormative baseline of “proto-entitlements”
that the legal system converts into authentic entitlements. The aspiration of
private law to allow for freedom and equality is not an aspiration to make
sure we can use our own private stuff to do what we want; it is the
aspiration to put us into relationships of equality with one another, in a
system in which we are able to ﬂourish as interdependent beings. Even
when we are talking about real property, for example, the real property
exists by virtue of the directives of conduct, requiring that others be
treated certain ways or that they not be mistreated in certain ways.
CONCLUSION
In my view, Dagan and Dorfman’s theory becomes more plausible,
powerful, and important when one disregards questions about the
public–private distinction and, instead of beginning with the classic
liberal, begins with the contemporary realist and instrumentalist. If one is
a realist enough to sidestep the public–private distinction and to see the
public-facing aspect of rules of tort, contract, and property, and if one
wishes to provide a normative framework for evaluating different possible
rules, the question is what sort of normative framework is appropriate.
Dagan and Dorfman’s strongest negative point is that there is no reason
59. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13.

178

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:165

to assume one must be principally utilitarian or welfarist in selecting a
normative framework. Then, if we accept political theoretic normative
arguments for seeking law that will support freedom and equality, we can
ask whether there is any reason to believe that areas like tort, contract,
and property relate to the realization of those values. If we understand
these areas as constituted in part by relational directives of conduct,
duties, and rights, then of course there is reason for a realist to see the
potentially pivotal role of such law in protecting freedom and equality.
There is, then, an irony when we ﬁnally turn back to the classic
liberal. Both this version of realism and the conceptualism or formalism
of the classic liberal do rely on the values of freedom and equality. They
have different conceptions of what freedom and equality require and
how the law best secures them. But until Dagan and Dorfman’s article,
private law theory had overwhelmingly placed welfarism along with
private law realism and instrumentalism, and placed freedom and
equality as core values within a highly conceptualistic private law theory
camp. Their important article shows that is a mistake.

